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CASE COMMENT
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-USE
OF RULE 23 RESTRICTED
A diversity action was brought in federal district court by four
property owners on behalf of themselves and some two hundred
other similarly situated land owners and lessees bordering on Lake
Champlain. The plaintiffs sought to maintain the suit as a class
action under Rule 23(b)(3)' of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
alleging damages from the defendant, International Peper Company, for alleged pollution of the lake. The district court found
that although each of the named representatives met the ten thousand dollar amount in controversy requirement of the diversity of
citizenship jurisdictional statute,2 many of the unnamed members
of the class did not. The court, therefore, refused to allow the suit
to proceed as a class action. 3 The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed,4 and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
Held, affirmed. Each and every individual plaintiff in a Rule
23(b)(3) class action must satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., 94 S. Ct. 505 (1973).
The concept of the class action is not new. English equity
practice originated the use of the class suit to make the administration of justice more convenient for the court and the parties and
to avoid a multiplicity of suits where the rights and liabilities of
many persons similarly situated could be fairly determined in one
action. Justice Story, in the early case of West v. Randall,7 ac'FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
7rhe diversity of citizenship jurisdictional statute provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or subjects
thereof; and
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1970).
'Zahn v. International Paper Co., 53 F.R.D. 430, 434 (D. Vt. 1971).
'469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
5410 U.S. 925 (1973).
13B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTIcE T 23.02, at 23-71 (2d ed. 1969).
729 F. Cas. 718 (No. 17,424) (C.C.R.I. 1820).
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cepted the class action practice as sound procedure in this country.
In the early part of this century, the class action was included as
Rule 38 of the Equity Rules of Procedure: "When the question is
one of common or general interest constituting a class so numerous
before the court, one
as to make it impracticable to bring them all
'8
whole."
the
for
defend
or
sue
may
more
or
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were being drafted
in 1938, a provision for class actions was included? The new federal
rules expanded the availability of the class action by making the
procedure available for both actions at law and bills in equity.9 In
the former equity practice, the class action could be used only in
cases of compulsory joinder;" however, the new Federal Rules
added two other situations where the class action device could be
used. The first, called the "hybrid" class action, involved the enforcement of rights which were several, when the object of the
action was the adjudication of claims affecting specific property
'Equity R. 38, 226 U.S. 659 (1912).
'The 1938 Rule 23 provided as follows:
(a) Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous as
to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of them,
one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of all may,
on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the right sought to
be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner of a
primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of the class
thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims
which do or may affect specific property involved in the action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact affecting the
several rights and a common relief is sought.
(b) Secondary Action by Shareholders.
(c) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought to be
enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of this rule
notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the right is
one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice shall be
given only if the court requires it.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 2. This Rule abolished all procedural distinctions between law
and equity, which had the effect of making the class action procedure of Rule 23
apply to both law and equity.
"Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Smith, 266 U.S. 152 (1924); Coiron v. Millaudon,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 113 (1856); Dandridge v. Washington, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 370 (1829);
Marshall v. Beverly, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 313 (1820).
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involved in the action."2 The second new addition, called the "spurious" class action, was not a class suit at all, but merely a procedure for the permissive joinder of all plaintiffs similarly situated
when a common question of law or fact existed and a common
relief was sought.'3 The justification for the spurious class action
was its convenience in litigating numerous individual claims in one
action. It was actually an invitation to all persons similarly situated to join the action and litigate their separate claims as one.
However, the decision in a spurious class action had no binding
effect on the members of the class who had not become parties to
the action.' 4
By 1965 it had become apparent that Rule 23 was vague and
unworkable.' 5 The problems stemmed from the obscure categories
-labeled true, hybrid, and spurious-and the difficulties which
many courts had in distinguishing them.'" Consequently, the class
action procedural rule was completely rewritten. Amended Rule 23
establishes prerequisites for the maintenance of all class actions, 7
eliminates the ambiguous categories and replaces them with readily distinguishable types of class actions,' 8 provides that any such
action litigated to a final decision will be res judicata to all members of the class whether or not the judgment is favorable to the
class,' 9 and establishes standard procedures for the fair conduct of
the actions. 0
The decision in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co. is not an
interpretation of Rule 23, but an interpretation of the jurisdictional amount requirement under the diversity statute. The traditional judicial interpretation of the jurisdictional amount requirement has been that the separate and distinct claims of two or more
plaintiffs could not be aggregated in order to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement,2 ' except in cases in which a single
supra note 6, T 23.09, at 2571.
' 1d. 1 23.10[1] at 2601.
"Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940). See also Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714
(1877).
"Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966).
"Id. For a discussion of these problems, see Developments in the Law: Multiparty Litigationin the Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 931 (1958).
'"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
19Id. 23(b).
"Id. 23(c)(3).
11Id. 23(c), (d), (e).
2
Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39 (1911). See also Pinel v.
Pinel, 240 U.S. 594 (1916).
'MOORE,
3
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plaintiff seeks to aggregate two or more of his own claims against
a single defendant or where two or more plaintiffs have united to
enforce a single title or right in which they have a common and
undivided interest. 22 However, prior to the holding in Zahn, once
the class action proceedings had been initiated by representatives,
each of whom claimed ten thousand dollars in damages, the other
members of the class, regardless of whether they claimed the requisite amount, could join in the class action through failure to opt
out of the proceeding, as required by the Rule. 21 Since the Zahn
decision, all members of the class are required to claim the jurisdictional amount or be dismissed from the class action.
The Court based its decision on its recent holding, in Snyder
v. Harris,2 that individual claims of multiple plaintiffs could not
be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount requirement.
Snyder, however, is factually distinguishable from Zahn. In
Snyder, none of the plaintiffs could satisfy the ten thousand dollar
jurisdictional amount requirement,2 whereas, in Zahn, each of the
four named plaintiffs did so. Unfortunately, Justice Black, writing
for the majority in Snyder, quoted dictum from another case that
"it is essential that the demand of each be the requisite jurisdictional amount. 12 6 This language was adopted by the majority in
Zahn as authority for the Court's decision."
The dissent indicated that the major controversy in Zahn did
not involve judicial interpretation of the jurisdictional amount
statute or aggregation of claims, but rather the concept of ancillary
jurisdiction in the federal courts.28 Ancillary jurisdiction is a procedural concept whereby a federal court acquires jurisdiction of a
case in its entirety and, "as an incident to disposition of a matter
properly before it, possesses jurisdiction to decide other matters
22

Woodside v. Beckham, 216 U.S. 117 (1910); Waite v. Santa Cruz, 184 U.S.
302, 328-29 (1902); Wheless v. St. Louis, 180 U.S. 379, 382 (1901).
2Cf. Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94, 96-99 (4th Cir. 1968); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d
149 (3d Cir. 1968).
24394 U.S. 332 (1969).
"Id. at 333.

"Id. at 336. Justice Black was quoting from Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co.,
222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911). This case is distinguishable in that neither of the plaintiffs
could meet the requisite jurisdictional amount.
2'Additionally, the Court relied on the case of Clark v. Paul Grey, Inc., 306 U.S.
583 (1939). This case, too, can be distinguished from Zahn in that the damages had
to be aggregated in order to reach the requisite jurisdictional amount.
294 S. Ct. at 514.
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raised by the case of which it could not take cognizance were they
independently presented."2 An ancillary claim may be heard without regard to the citizenship of the parties, the amount in controversy, or any other factor ordinarily determinative of a federal
court's jurisdiction. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,3" the Court
considered the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, often regarded as
closely related to ancillary jurisdiction.3' As stated in Gibbs, pendent jurisdiction, that is, the hearing of a claim without independent jurisdictional grounds when it is joined with a claim for which
jurisdiction is proper, exists whenever two claims arise from "a
common nucleus of operative fact" and are such that the plaintiff
would normally be "expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding."3 Pendent jurisdiction is discretionary with the court;
considerations of "judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to
33
litigants" control its use.
Under the Zahn holding, when those plaintiffs who cannot
meet the ten thousand dollar jurisdictional requirement are dismissed from the suit, they will have no alternative, if they wish to
maintain their suit, but to file in state court. This presents a situation whereby two judicial systems, state and federal, are called
upon to decide the same issues on the same facts-the exact situation which the doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction were
created to avoid.
In addition to frustrating the stated purpose of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure-"to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"-" the Zahn decision will force
many 23(b)(3) class actions from the federal courts altogether. In
the Zahn case, the district judge not only dismissed the members
of the class without ten thousand dollars in damages but also the
entire suit as well. The court reasoned that a class consisting of all
land owners having ten thousand dollars or more in damages would
not be practicable because each member of the class seeking to
assert this claim would have to appear and at least plead, and
perhaps prove, that he has a good faith claim to that amount. This
would eliminate any advantage of the class action over other
§ 9, at 19 (2d ed. 1970).
-383 U.S. 715 (1966).
3"See WRIGHT, supra note 29, § 20, at 65.
"2383 U.S. at 725.
=Id. at 726.
"FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
"C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS
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methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy,
as required by Rule 23(b)(3).n If the same position is taken by
other district courts, the 23(b)(3) class action could no longer be
brought in federal courts under the diversity statute.
This aspect of the Zahn decision will cause hardships to many
litigants. First, there may be no other method of obtaining service
of process and jurisdiction over all parties involved in the action
other than through the federal courts. Second, the rules of civil
procedure of many states do not provide for class actions. 6 Finally,
in many states; litigants unable to use the class action device and,
therefore, forced to sue individually, might be precluded from
bringing suit because of the prohibitive costs which may be involved."
The Zahn decision may have a similar effect on class actions
which seek the federal courts through the general federal question
statute, 38 because this, too, has a ten thousand dollar amount re"The district court stated:
[A] class defined as all lakefront landowners and lessees . . .having

$10,000 in controversy would not be feasible. The class would have to be
further defined .... A determination before trial of the landowners actually encompassed within this class would require the unnamed class
members to appear and at least plead, and perhaps prove facts substantiating, an amount in controversy. This would eliminate any advantage of
a class action and would therefore not be properly maintainable because
class treatment would not be "superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy," as required by Rule
23 (b)(3).
53 F.R.D. at 433.
"Six states have no provision for class actions: Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Mississippi, New Hampshire, and Virginia. Fifteen other states have very limited
procedures based upon the old equity rule regarding class actions: ALA. CODE tit.
7, § 128 (1958); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809 (1962 Replacement Volume); CAL. Civ.
PRO. CODE § 382 (Deering 1972); CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-105 (1958); FLA. R.
Civ. P. 1.220; ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 23-24 (Smith-Hurd 1968); MD. R. Civ. P.
209; MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 231, § 4A (1956); NEB.REv. STAT. § 25-319 (1964); N.Y.
Civ. PRAc. LAW § 1005 (McKinney 1963); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 233 (1960);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 13.170 (1971); PA. R. Civ. P. 2230; S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-205
(1962); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 260.12 (1957).
3
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated recently that one of the most
important functions of the class action is that it "provides small claimants with a
method of obtaining redress for claims which would otherwise be too small to
warrant individual litigation." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. granted, 414 U.S. 908 (1973).
128 U.S.C. § 1331: "Federal question-Amount in controversy-Cost.-(a)
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
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quirement. Thus, unless methods are found to circumvent the
Zahn decision, it will greatly impair the use of the 23(b)(3) class
action.
Many statutes give jurisdiction to federal courts without re-

gard to jurisdictional amount. 3 Most of these jurisdictional stat-

utes deal with specialized areas of the law such as admiralty,"
bankruptcy," and postal matters. 2 However, two such statutes
may be useful in circumventing the Zahn decision. The first of
these provides simply that "the district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding arising under any Act
of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and commerce against restraints and monopolies." 43 This statute covers a
multitude of controversies without regard to the amount in conflict
or diversity of citizenship.4
A second jurisdictional statute can be used in some limited
actions. Jurisdiction is given to the federal courts without regard
to amount in controversy or diversity of citizenship for those actions brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1871.11 This Act gives
individuals a right of action for damages against any person who
"under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State or Territory," deprives one of any "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the
United States. Despite the broad language of this statute, the
courts have consistently held that state licensing activities do not
thereby bring the actions of private individuals or corporations
under color of state statute." Nevertheless, the Civil Rights Act
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and
costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States."
-E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333-62 (1971).
'"Id. § 1333.
4
11d. § 1334.
421d. § 1339.
43 d. § 1337.
"Professor Wright believes that section 1337 grants jurisdiction to the district

courts whenever the suit involves an act whose constitutional basis is the commerce
clause. WRmIr, supra note 29, § 32, at 109.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1971).
4642 U.S.C. § 1983 (1971).
t
See, e.g., Moose Lodge v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972). A recent federal court
decision in West Virginia held that the plaintiff's claim that the State's air pollution abatement program amounted to nothing more than a State license for the
corporation to pollute was not cognizable under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and,
hence, subject matter jurisdiction could not be invoked under the civil rights juris-
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may permit class actions in federal courts when the pleadings can
be fit into the requirements of the statute.
A final alternative to the difficulties presented by the Zahn
decision is simply to file the class action in state court; however,
some problems also arise with this approach. Only seventeen states
have procedural rules for class actions modeled on the amended
federal rule." Twelve states, including West Virginia, have class
action procedures based upon the original federal rule with the
nebulous distinctions between true, hybrid, and spurious class
suits." The remaining twenty-one states have either no procedure
for class actions or a very limited provision based on the old Equity
Rule. 0
The best solution to the Zahn decision, as Professor Wright
suggests, 51 would be to amend the diversity and general federal
question statutes to provide that only one plaintiff need have the
ten thousand dollar jurisdictional amount to bring a class action
suit. An amendment expanding the jurisdiction and workload of
the federal courts, however, is extremely unlikely at this time.
Thus, it seems that the solution to the problems brought about by
Zahn will have to be worked out on the state level. Each state not
operating on class action procedures based on the amended federal
rule should give serious consideration to adopting the federal procedure. If each state were to have a class action procedure based
on the amended federal rule, a just, speedy, and inexpensive procedure would be available in many cases where numerous litigants
are involved.
Charles J. Kaiser, Jr.
dictional statute. Hagedorn v. Union Carbide Corp., 363 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D.W.
Va. 1973).
"ARIz. R. Civ. P. 23; CoLo. R. Civ. P. 23; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-223 (Cum.
Supp. 1973); Ky. R. Civ. P. 23; IND. R. Civ. P. 23; MINN. R. Civ. P. 23; Mo. R. CIv.
P. 52.08; MoN. R. Civ. P. 23; NEV. R. Civ. P. 23; N.D.R. Crv. P. 23; OHIo R. Civ.
P. 23; S.D. COMPIED LAws ANN. § 15-6-23 (1967); TENN. R. Civ. P. 23; UTAH R.
Civ. P. 23; VT. R. Crv. P. 23; WASH. R. Crv. P. 23; Wvo. R. Crv. P. 23.
"ALASKA R. Civ. P. 23; IDAHO R. Civ. P. 23; IoWA R. Civ. P. 42; LA. CODE CIV.
PRO. ANN. art. 591-97 (West 1960); ME. R. Civ. P. 23; MICH. GE. CT. R. 208; N.J.
CIv. PRAC. R. 4:36-1; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-1(23); N.C.R. Civ. P. 23; R.I.R. Civ.
P. 23; TEX. R. Civ. P. 42; W. VA. R. Civ. P. 23.
5aSee note 36 supra.
"WRIGHT, supra note 25, § 32, at 110.
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